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ABSTRACT: The Mondragon Cooperative Group reflects the effort to combine the
basic objectives of business development in international markets with job creation, the
use of democratic methods in the organisation of the business and a commitment to
the development of its surrounding community. The multi-nationalisation of Mon-
dragon cooperatives entails new dilemmas, paradoxes and contradictions regard-
ing these objectives. This article analyses the case of the Mondragon cooperative-
multinational Fagor Electrodomésticos. Following years of international expansion
via foreign direct investment, the recent recession forced Fagor to institute radical job
restructuring processes, both in the plants of the parent company in the Basque Country
and in its European subsidiaries: the French company Fagor-Brandt and the former
communist Polish firm Wrozamet. Finally, the Basque domestic appliance company,
Fagor, declared bankruptcy in November 2013. Analysing the economical and organi-
zational problems during the downfall of Fagor, and the measures taken to downsize
employment in the Basques factories and in the foreign subsidiaries, helps us further
our knowledge about the organisational characteristics of the Mondragon multination-
als and reflect on the possibilities of extending the cooperative model to subsidiaries.
Keywords: Mondragon, Fagor, Brandt, Fagor-Mastercook, cooperatives, multinationals, subsidiaries,
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1 Introduction
Ever since the founding, in 1956, of the first cooperative Ulgor-Fagor Electrodomesticos
Sdad. Coop (hereafter referred to as Fagor) in the Basque Country, the Mondragon
cooperatives have aroused lively interest and sometimes, controversy. The dynamism
and achievements of the Mondragon worker-owned and worker-managed firms, which
have now far exceeded its founders’ expectations (Cheney 1999) in employment, economic
success, activities and geographical reach, have attracted the international attention
of practitioners, politicians, business people, trade unionists, academics and others.
The group, which was renamed Mondragon Humanity at Work in 2008, functions as
a federation of more than one hundred cooperatives in four areas of activity: finance,
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industry, retail and knowledge. With a total of 83,569 employees in 2012, Mondragon
has become the seventh-largest business group in Spain and the leading group in the
Basque Country.
Throughout their history, Mondragon cooperatives have been able to maintain
a very high business survival rate (Elortza et al. 2012), while maintaining their
democratic character. Soon after their founding, Mondragon cooperatives acquired
a ‘mythical status’ as a working model of an alternative to the capitalist mode of
production (Azkarraga et al. 2012, 76). This status has endured; indeed, the Mondragon
companies have become ‘the’ model for successful cooperative business to follow.
Nevertheless, the multinationalisation of the Mondragon cooperatives has called their
traditional democratic character into question. Furthermore, in the context of the
recent crisis, the bankruptcy of Fagor – the oldest and the largest industrial Basque
cooperative – has cast doubt on the survival records of the Mondragon cooperatives.
In fact, in the context of economic globalisation, Fagor had been, one of the first
Mondragon cooperatives that engaged in foreign direct investment in the early 1990s.
In 2013, Fagor, and another 27 multinationals belonging to the Mondragon Group, con-
trolled 122 foreign subsidiaries with 11,012 foreign workers all over the world (around
38% of the Mondragon industrial workforce. These cooperative-multinationals competed
in global markets, and most of them – with the significant exception of Fagor – were
coping with the economic crisis with considerable success. They were the mainstays of
the employment, innovation and wealth creation capacity of the Mondragon complex.
Nevertheless, there are some questions regarding how true they remain to the long-
held democratic values and principles that originally lay at the core of the Mondragon
cooperative experience.
In this article we study the case of Fagor which – following years of intense interna-
tional expansion through firm acquisitions, greenfield investments and joint ventures –
had been forced to pursue radical employment downsizing processes, both in the Basque
Country and in its European subsidiaries, eventually calling in the receivers until its
closure in November 2013. Our research, following the judgment rendered by the Webbs
about the inexorable failure of workers’ cooperatives as businesses or as democratic
organisations (Webb and Webb 1914), should shed light on the economic and organiza-
tional problems that Fagor was facing before its closure and on the democratic character
of Fagor, mainly regarding its international operations. The research was supported by
the evidence from three firms that we studied – the parent company Fagor, the French
subsidiary Fagor Brandt and the Polish subsidiary Fagor Mastercook – where dozens of
interviews were conducted with an assorted numbers of workers, members, managers
and other members of the governing bodies of the companies. This study, while de-
tailing unique features of the Mondragon system, intends to extend the understanding
about generic problems of alternative organizations, principally with regard to their
international activities.
The article is organised as follows. The first part considers the paradoxes that
arise as a result of the transformation of cooperatives into multinationals and presents
the case to be studied. The second part analyses the internationalisation process that
the parent company Fagor underwent, and examines its job management during the
crisis. In the third part, we analyse the industrial decline and downsizing in employ-
ment at the French subsidiary, Fagor-Brandt, while the fourth part takes a look at the
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situation facing the Polish subsidiary, Fagor-Mastercook. The following section reviews
the distinguishing features of the Fagor multinational and the article concludes with
final remarks drawn from our findings.
2 Short literature review on Mondragon internationalisation and theoretical
approach
At the beginning of the twentieth century, when examining the tensions between
economic pressures and social commitments, Beatrice and Sidney Webb pronounced a
damning verdict on workers’ cooperatives: ‘Democracies of produces as all experience
shows have hitherto failed, with almost complete uniformity . . . In the relatively few
instances in which such enterprises have not succumbed as business concerns, they
have ceased to be democracies of produces, managing their own work and have become
in effect, associations of capitalist . . . making profit for themselves by the employment at
wages outside their association’ (Webb and Webb 1914: 133). The Webbs’ asserted that
there is an inevitable pressure from the capitalist system, but also that the cooperative
members ‘will suffer a change in class identification’ (Cornforth et al. 1988: 67).
These issues have long attracted theoretical and empirical work by economists of
different stripes. Theoretical literature has been dominated by models explaining how
structural weaknesses cause labor managed firms and worker cooperatives to disappear,
e.g. the role of capital accumulation in Vanek (1977) and the opportunity to profit from
the use of cheaper hired labor in Ben-Ner (1984). Nevertheless, there are many authors
that call into question the determinism assumed in the degeneration thesis from both
theoretical and empirical viewpoints (see for example, Burdin and Dean 2009).
The rise of multinational enterprises and the consequent globalisation of the world
economy have been one of the most important economic phenomena of the second half
of the XXth century (Dicken 2011, Delbono et al. 2013). Even many small and medium-
sized enterprises, including many cooperatives, have had to adopt international growth
strategies in order to remain competitive. This phenomenon has accentuated the degen-
erative tensions that cooperatives have always had to face to adapt to capitalist market
conditions (Spear 2001, Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). The changes taking place in the
global economy pose a considerable challenge to cooperatives today: i.e. how to develop
processes of multinationalisation that are consistent with their nature (McMurtry and
Reed 2009, Flecha and Ngai 2014).
Since the early decades of its journey, the Mondragon experience has been pre-
sented by many international academic researchers as evidence to contradict the Webbs´
assertion. Some of the research was carried out to emphasize the economic performance
and efficiency of Mondragon (Bradley and Gelb 1987), while other research underlined
the democratic character of the experience, in terms of decision making and leadership
(Whyte and Whyte 1991), the community embedment (Miller 2002) and the communi-
tarian governance (Ridley-Duff 2010). Other studies highlighted how Mondragon coped
with the difficulties and the tensions to achieve its targets in social terms, from the
organizational culture approach (Grenwood and Gonzalez 1992, Cheney 1999). Critical
works have been somewhat scarce, but at least two studies could be mentioned: one
about the rhetoric in Mondragon (Taylor 1994) and another about the difficult relations
with the Basque labour movement (Kasmir 1996). Many of these researches have been
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focused on Fagor Elec, as the largest, oldest and maybe most representative industrial
cooperative of the Mondragon group.
The multi-nationalisation of the core Mondragon industrial cooperatives has dra-
matically transformed the Mondragon experience. However, there is relatively little
research that addresses this phenomenon, which is closely related to the Webbs’ assess-
ment. Most of the research on Mondragon cooperative-multinationals has underlined
that international expansion has not been detrimental to local employment (Errasti
et al. 2003, Luzarraga and Irizar 2012). Mondragon multinationals have pursued a
multi-location strategy both by searching for new emerging markets and by following
customers. During the past decades, in general terms, the cooperatives that became
multinationals have created more jobs in the Basque Country than those that did not
multi-nationalise (Luzarraga and Irizar 2012, Arando et al. 2010, Mondragon 2012b).
In some cases, however – as in the Fagor case studied here – it is not so clear that
this pattern has been followed. Many studies also highlight that one key to dealing
with the crisis has been the internationalisation of the cooperatives (Arando et al. 2010,
Flecha and Santa Cruz 2011, Elortza et al. 2012, Agirre et al. 2014). Mondragon’s ex-
ports increased by up to 70% of the total sales (Mondragon 2012a). Foreign subsidiaries
produced 23% of Mondragon’s total industrial output in 2011, amounting to almost half
of Mondragon’s international sales (Mondragon 2012a).
Surprisingly, research regarding the characteristics of Mondragon subsidiaries
has been more limited. It is well known that the multi-nationalisation strategy has
involved the acquisition of firms and greenfield investments and that the foreign sub-
sidiaries’ workforce is made up entirely of non-member affiliated workers (Clamp 2000,
Errasti et al. 2003, Luzarraga and Irizar 2012). Some researchers argue for a degener-
ation thesis of Mondragon cooperatives – for example, Huet (2000, 284) contends that
Mondragon ‘became a traditional capitalist employer operating its own plants in low-
wage countries.’ Errasti et al. (2003, 127) on the other hand, drew attention to some
interesting cases of modest advances in workers’ participation in foreign subsidiaries
such as ‘ . . . participation of employees on the Board of directors of an affiliated company,
of profit sharing systems and even the integration of a number of the local directors of
the affiliated companies as ‘collaboration’ part-members of the parent cooperative’.
Luzarraga and Irizar (2012, 114) state that Mondragon global cooperatives follow
a strategy of international multi-location production ‘as a case of cooperative innovation
towards a people-centred globalization’, and highlight some management ‘best prac-
tices’ utilized by Mondragon in its foreign subsidiaries regarding labour conditions,
workers’ participation in profits and ownership and commitment to the local community
(Luzarraga and Irizar 2012). According to MacLeod (2006, 33), the social dimension of
foreign subsidiaries stems from their aim to protect the headquarters’ cooperative iden-
tity and social stability, and therefore Mondragon firms remain ‘the closest model of a
true social firm that actually exists in the world.’ Errasti et al. (2003, 127) underline
the opportunity that Mondragon multinationals offer to build a new model closer to a
‘democratic multinational enterprise.’ Vanek (2007, 304) argues that if that evolution is
possible, then there might be hope ‘of moving towards a world of optimal participation,
rather than a world of exploiting capitalism.’
In contrast to these approaches, we argue that there is a need for more re-
search and a closer, more critical examination of the paradoxes and chiaroscuros in the
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relations between Mondragon cooperative parent companies and their capitalist for-
eign subsidiaries. Yet we have very little research to show whether, in a continuum
of forms of industrial organisation, these subsidiaries lie nearer the pole of maximum
labour participation and workplace democracy characteristic of the traditional workers’
cooperatives of Mondragon, or whether they are situated closer to the opposite pole.
Put another way, are the multinationals of Mondragon Humanity at Work really differ-
ent from conventional multinational corporations, as the company’s slogan and mission
statement would suggest?
In terms of labour-management participation, Mondragon cooperatives have pre-
sented a number of dilemmas and paradoxes stemming from their powerful commitment
to participation and democracy (Greenwood et al. 1991, Stohl and Cheney 2001, Cheney
2006). Multi-nationalisation only exacerbates such tensions, as there is a deep antago-
nism between the cooperative model, closer to the community-based enterprise (Peredo
and Chrisman 2007), and the multinational corporation model. The combination of the
two creates odd paradoxes – starting with the name: what should we call these hy-
brids? Coopitalist multinationals, maybe? For the most part, though, the tensions and
incongruities go beyond semantics.
To uncover the extent to which Mondragon coopitalist multinationals differ from
other multinationals, one must not only analyse the cooperative features of the parent
company but also examine its characteristics from an international business stand-
point. Specifically, one needs to determine how the contribution made by Mondragon
subsidiaries to the countries where they are located compares to that made by conven-
tional multinationals. From a labour standpoint, one must analyse how working for a
Mondragon subsidiary differs from working for some other multinational corporation.
A comprehensive analysis would require one to deconstruct the Mondragon multination-
als and analyse them with regard to the key characteristics of multinationals, such as
the extent, pattern and motives of foreign direct investment, relations between the par-
ent company and subsidiaries, working conditions in subsidiaries, technology transfer,
locus of decision-taking, capital flows and transfer prices, or value added distribution
and social responsibility (Dunning and Lundan 2008, Dicken 2011, Forsgsren 2008).
The general guideline in such research would be that the more these key dimensions
correspond to Mondragon cooperative principles, the more they would differ from the
practice of other multinationals.
This study focuses on the organizational character. One could reasonably expect
coopitalist multinationals to differ from other conventional multinationals with respect
to the relationship of the parent to the subsidiaries; in other words, their handling of the
integration-responsiveness dilemma (Doz and Prahalad 1991) may have special inflec-
tions. The dilemma was first formulated by Hymer (1979, 48) as follows: ‘multinational
corporations must develop an organisational structure to balance the need to coordinate
and integrate operations, with the need to adapt to a patchwork quilt of languages, laws
and customs’. A multinational may resolve this dilemma through one of two different
organisational approaches: the dominating and the federative, or in other terms, the
hierarchical or the heterarchical (Hedlund 1993). The dominating multinational reflects
a clear hierarchy in which the corporate headquarters decides and implements the main
strategies for the entire multinational. By contrast, in the federative multinational firm,
the headquarters has to compete with different subsidiaries for strategic influence, in
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a model closer to a business network (Goshal and Bartlett 1990). According to Hymer,
multinationals will seek to reduce the federative nature of multi-nationality because it
is inimical to multinationals’ controlling elites (Hymer 1979). In the case of the Mon-
dragon multinationals, on the one hand, one might expect their cooperative principles
to prompt them to implement a model closer to the federative or heterarchical model.
On the other hand, it is possible that not just the top management of the Mondragon
multinationals but also the working members, as owners and employees of the parent
company, may try to limit the federative nature of multi-nationality.
3 Field work: interviews at the coopitalist multinational Fagor
Before its closure, Fagor Electrodomésticos was a cooperative-multinational com-
posed of eighteen production plants in six countries: Basque Country (8 plants), France
(4), China (3), Italy (1), Poland (1) and Morocco (1). Following the Webbs’ statement,
this case study analyses, on the one hand, the economic and organizational problems
of the rise – and mainly the downfall - of the parent cooperative Fagor, together with
the French subsidiary, Fagor-Brandt and the Polish subsidiary, Fagor-Mastercook. On
the other hand, the study analyses the democratic character of Fagor, examining the
corporate-level governance of Fagor, including the authority structures and participative
systems, with special focus on the industrial relations and the measures implemented
by Fagor to cope with the employment downsizing process in its European plants. This
analysis will allows us to assess: [1] whether or not Fagor behaved responsibly with
respect to job losses in its parent company and in its subsidiaries; [2] whether it was
primarily of a dominant or federative nature in its relations with those subsidiaries; and
[3] whether or not Fagor made any advancement to extend the cooperative model to the
subsidiaries.
For this empirical research on Fagor, we employed the contemporary case study
methodology (Yin 1998). This methodology is well suited to making the existence and
the inner workings of the Mondragon subsidiaries – which have so far mainly operated
out of view as opaque ‘black boxes’– visible. It is also suitable for taking a critical look
at the paradoxical aspects and tensions that arise from international labour relation
practices. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the limitations of the method,
particularly the question of how representative or informative a single case study can be
(Eisenhardt 1989). Here, studying Fagor has some advantages: Fagor was the flagship
industrial cooperative in Mondragon, and the oldest and largest one; many researchers
have considered it the most representative of the Mondragon cooperative system (Whyte
and Whyte 1991, Morrison 1991, Greenwood et al. 1991). The subsidiaries analysed here
were the largest of the Mondragon system and have a long history.
This descriptive and interpretative case study is primarily based on observation
and interviews conducted at Fagor and its subsidiaries. At Fagor’s Mondragon coop-
erative, extensive informal discussions were supplemented by 25 semi-structured in-
terviews conducted over the course of 2012 with worker-members, management and
representatives of the Governing Council, the Social Council and the quasi-union
AK of Fagor in the Basque Country. At Fagor-Mastercook in Poland and the Fagor-
Brandt plant in Lyon, France, we conducted 27 interviews with management, workers,
and trade union representatives. These interviews were carried out partly during the
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two-week visits we paid to each subsidiary during the spring and summer of 2012 and
partly by telephone. The interviews, which lasted from one to one and a half hours,
were conducted at the companies in Basque, Spanish, French, English and Polish (in
the last case with the help of a translator). A visit to the Verolanuova plant in Italy
was unfortunately considered inappropriate by Fagor management at the time of our
research due to ongoing negotiations regarding changes at the plant.
The interview subjects were chosen using different approaches, guaranteeing the
reliability and representativeness of the study. Initially, we interviewed some members
of the Governing Board of the cooperative and of the Board of Directors of the sub-
sidiaries. We also conducted interviews with the general managers and human resource
managers of the companies studied. We interviewed trade unions representatives of
the workers council at the subsidiaries, as well as some members of the Social Council
of Fagor – which replicates the role of workers council and trade unions, with almost
no presence within Mondragon. Apart from these agents involved in the governance of
the companies, we interviewed some worker-members from the cooperatives and some
workers from the subsidiaries. These last interviews were carried outside the compa-
nies. Some workers were identified with the help of the trade union and social council
representatives. Others were contacted casually in bars and cafeterias around the com-
panies. Local Fagor representatives did not assist the authors in identifying possible
interview subjects. The interviewed subjects were told that their responses would not
be reported to Fagor and their anonymity was guaranteed.
Interviews, of course, are always shaped by the subjective perceptions of both
the researchers and the interviewees (Hamel 1993). To alleviate this problem, we em-
phasised the need to analyse not only the best or worst practices (which only nurture
myths and stereotypes), but also the complexity of the policies of parent companies
towards foreign subsidiaries and their labour relations. Despite their limitations, we
regard interviews as a valuable strategy, as giving voice to people actively involved
at different levels of the international organisation refines our understanding of the
issues and points towards changes that might eliminate the causes of conflicts and
constraints.
The research was substantially facilitated by the fact that we have considerable
experience researching the Mondragon cooperatives and their subsidiaries, during which
we have made a number of personal contacts with cooperative and subsidiary managers.
This facilitated gaining access to the companies as well as establishing contacts with the
interviewees. In addition to informal discussions and semi-structured interviews, our
work also draws on existing research on Fagor and on documentation made available by
the company.
This research was conducted before the cataclysmic closure of Fagor in October
2013. It can thus provide little in the way of systematic follow up on the Fagor post-
closure developments. In the first draft of the article we concluded that not only was
the survival of the cooperative model in jeopardy, but so was that of the company itself;
a view shared by many interviewees, but that nobody expected would really happen.
While the events affecting Fagor have been calamitous for the cooperative experience,
we consider that the basic lessons from our research have stood the test of recent events.
Nevertheless, some aspects of the study have been adapted to the new circumstances.
For a more detailed analysis of Fagor´s closure see Errasti and Bretos (2016).
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4 The Basque cooperative company Fagor
4.1 From pioneering cooperative to multinational: eat or be eaten
Fagor pioneered the Mondragon cooperative experience. It came into being in 1956
when five ex-students from a technical college in Mondragon, imbued with the social
transformation ideas of the priest Arizmendiarrieta, started producing small lamps
and heating devices (Ormaetxea 1999). Fagor played a key role in launching other
industrial cooperatives as well as the financial cooperative Caja Laboral, the social
security cooperative Lagun Aro and research cooperatives like Ikerlan. Ultimately, it
inspired the creation of the Mondragon Cooperative Group (Larrañaga 1998).
From the 1990s to 2010s, Fagor’s international growth was impressive. Expressing
an opinion common among Mondragon managers (Cheney 1999, Irizar 2006), a top
manager at Fagor Fabian Bilbao, noted that ‘growth and internationalisation are not just
the only way to be competitive, but also the sole means of survival’. The Fagor cooperative
became a multinational to be able to compete with multinationals that had become
established in Spain after the country joined the European Union in 1986. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, it mainly aimed at the North African (Moroccan and Egyptian)
and Latin American markets, taking over companies in those regions as well as in the
Basque Country (Errasti and Mendizabal 2007, Guillen and Garcia-Canal 2012).
These efforts, however, had rather mixed outcomes, and in the late 1990s Fagor
decided to focus on European markets, establishing a joint venture with the German
company Vaillant and taking over the Polish cooker manufacture, Wrozamet. The great
leap forward came in 2002, when Fagor participated in the takeover of the French
competitor Brandt Électroménager, which at the time was as large as Fagor. Later
expansion also took Fagor into China in 2003 (Errasti and Mendizabal 2007). Following
all this growth process, Fagor offered a broad range of small appliances and household
equipment for washing, cooking, and refrigeration in over 130 countries (Fagor 2012a).
As a result of this growth, Fagor bazkideak (members), who represented one third of
the total workforce, were confronted with the dynamics of a multinational corporation
competing in highly globalised international capitalist markets.
4.2 The rise and decline of Fagor
The rise and decline of Fagor took place over a very short time span. At the
peak of the Spanish property bubble in 2006, over 11,000 people worked for the Fagor
multinational group. By 2013, that is to say, in the midst of the recession, only a little
over 5,500 of those jobs remained. In the same period, Fagor’s sales also fell sharply,
and the company experienced a 30% drop in turnover. During Fagor´s last five years the
company underwent continuous and increasingly severe losses (Fagor 2012a).
Fagor was not the only one experiencing problems: the entire electrical household
appliance sector found itself immersed in the toughest situation it had had to face
in its life. In 2011, the sector was dominated in Europe by a small number of large
multinational competitors such as BSH (20% of market share), Electrolux (17%), Merloni
(11%) and Whirpool (10%), in addition to new Asian competitors such as Haiert, LG,
Samsung and Arcelik (Fagor 2012b). Since Fagor was one of the smallest competitors,
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with only a 6% market share, it experienced severe pressures. Its research budget was
only some 10% to 15% of that of its largest competitors like Whirlpool or BHS (European
Commission 2011); it was under considerable competitive pressure from firms from
emerging economies; and it was facing severe financial shortfalls. As one worker-member
of Fagor put it, ‘the days of external growth via takeovers – the eating period – have
come to an end; another cycle – the being eaten period – is now underway. This is the
law of the jungle’.
The crisis hit the cooperative production plants in the Basque Country hard: ac-
cording to our estimates, over 3,000 jobs were cut between 2007 and the definitive closure
in 2013 (Fagor 2008, 2012a, b). Fagor’s efforts to cope with job losses without resorting
to dismissals were based on traditional Mondragon solidarity mechanisms (Bradley and
Gelb 1987, Basterretxea and Albizu 2010, Elorza et al. 2012). These mainly involved: a)
Relocation: In the space of a few years, Fagor transferred worker-members to surround-
ing cooperatives that were more stable financially. b) Early retirement: Fagor reduced
the age of early retirement for its members from 61 to 58 years, with 80% of average
salary paid in settlement. c) Reduction in advances: Fagor members gave their majority
support over the past few years to several proposals submitted to their assembly that
aim to reduce advances and wages, and there were plans to ask members to put new
capital into the company (Fagor 2012b). d) Other measures: These included e.g. volun-
tary redundancies, leaves of absence, compensated job transfers and the suspension of
temporary contracts with guaranteed reinstatement. These were accompanied by more
flexible working conditions, an increase in mobility, more flexible work schedules and an
intensification of job pressure, all of which led to a marked deterioration of the quality
of members’ jobs.
In addition, other solidarity measures that helped Fagor mitigate its losses in-
cluded Mondragon area cooperatives’ pooling of a percentage of net surpluses for re-
distribution and members of these cooperatives taking wage cuts to help Fagor. These
measures were accompanied by further financial assistance provided by the Corporation
through the intercooperative funds. However, these efforts did not suffice to prevent the
collapse of Fagor. During 2013, after five consecutive years of heavy losses and wors-
ening finances, the corporation worked together with the cooperative in an emergency
business plan containing more adjustment measures and spending cuts. To confront
the restructuring process, Fagor received a €70 million cash injection from the Mon-
dragon cooperatives. Six months earlier, it had obtained €50 million from the Basque
government. By mid-2013, Fagor production and sales figures continued to fall and
they announced losses of €90 million. Facing financial shortfalls, suppliers had begun
to demand cash payment upon delivery of raw materials and components, while others
stopped deliveries of components altogether. During the summer of 2013, the situation
of the cooperative continued to worsen. A rescue committee was formed, with repre-
sentatives from the corporation, the Basque government, the Spanish government and
some banks. Cash continued to run out and losses accumulated. Finally, the Mondragon
Corporation decided not to lend more capital to Fagor and in a few days, on 15 October
2013, Fagor called in the receivers. One month later, the oldest and the largest in-
dustrial cooperative of Mondragon declared bankruptcy and passed into administrative
receivership.
In July 2014, Fagor was bought by the Catalan company Cata. The Mercantile
Court of San Sebastian awarded Fagor’s assets to the Catalan domestic appliance
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company for the price of €42.5 million. In May 2015, the new company called Edesa
Industrial S.L. employed around 550 employees in the former cooperative plants, less
than the 705 anticipated by the new management for 2015. Meanwhile, many Fagor
worker members have been retired, or required to take early retirement and relocated
(temporally or permanently) to other cooperatives of the Mondragon group. Less than
30% of the former Fagor members ended up collecting their unemployment benefit be-
cause there was no solution to their employment situation.
5 The French Fagor-Brandt subsidiary
5.1 A century of industrial capitalism
The French electrical household appliance company Brandt was founded in
1924 by Edgar Brandt, an ironworker-cum-artist-cum-entrepreneur, and originally spe-
cialised in light weaponry (Kahr 2010). By the time it was taken over by Fagor and the
Israeli group Elco in 2002, Brandt Électroménager had undergone successive mergers,
takeovers, nationalisations, privatisations, adjustment plans and bankruptcy (Errasti
and Mendizabal 2007). Fagor and the Mondragon Corporation bought all stakes in
Brandt in 2005, when the company maintained five production plants in France and one
in Italy. It retains, with several well known and worthy trademarks, a 17% market share
of the French electrical household appliance market, and has significant technological
capacity, particularly in induction ovens, cookers and washing machines.
5.2 Innovative solutions in view of relocation at Fagor-Brandt
Following the takeover by the Basque cooperative, Brandt Électroménager was
renamed Fagor-Brandt. Owing to the cooperative nature of the parent company, French
trade unions and workers assumed – ‘un peu naı̈vement,’ as Nahapétian (2010: 9) pointed
out – that relations with company management and the parent company of the group
might be better than relations with previous owners and management had been. How-
ever, the adjustment plan imposed by Fagor within a year of buying Brandt radically
changed Brandt workers’ outlook (Peyret and Argouse 2007). In the words of the CGT
representative in Lyon, Florence Lavialle: ‘Nothing changed. Fagor-Brandt is governed
by the same rules as the others – they only want to obtain profits.’
According to the Chairman of the Governing Council and Social Council of Fagor
and President of the Board of Directors of Fagor-Brandt, Jabier Retegi, the cooperative
finds itself ‘facing strong trade union dynamics which question everything. They know
that whatever happens, ultimately someone will end up buying them. They have an
asset in which all the sector’s manufacturers are interested: the trademarks.’ The long-
standing union culture among Brandt workers, combined with French labour legislation,
that has traditionally granted substantial bargaining power to unions, has helped ensure
their influence in the company (Nahapétian 2010). Moreover, witnessing numerous
company transformations and adjustments hardened the attitudes of workers and trade
unionists. At the end of 2012, some 1,900 people worked at Fagor-Brandt. Job losses since
the Fagor takeover had affected circa 2,300 people via lay-off proceedings, non-renewal
of temporary contracts, natural and early retirements, agreed withdrawals, dismissals
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for various reasons and the transfer of production plants. Within this context, it is
not surprising that relations between the parent company and trade unions – which
represent the direct workforce as well as managers and executives – have been tense
and difficult: many stoppages and strikes have been called at the various Fagor-Brandt
plants (Nahapétian 2010, Amado-Borthayre 2009).
Despite difficulties, there were cases in which the cooperative philosophy underly-
ing Fagor’s business practices have resulted in more worker-friendly policies than might
be expected of a conventional multinational. This was noticeable in the job maintenance
experiences in conjunction with the transfer of the Lyon plant (France) in 2011 and
the Verolanuova plant (Italy) in 2012. These plants have both been transferred, not
sold, to company groups outside Fagor to produce other products, accounting for most
of the current employment. White goods’ production at these plants is being transferred
to Mondragon and Poland. The new company SITL, ran by the French entrepreneur,
Pierre Millet, expected to employ 460 workers from among the 560 employed to make
solar panels, water purifiers and electric cars (SITL 2012). Although Fagor did not have
a capital stake in the companies, it provided resources to help with the transformation.
In one case of productive relocation, Fagor prevented the factory from closing down
and making all the workers redundant. In the words of the human resource manager at
Fagor and representative on the Board of Directors of Fagor-Brandt, Xabier Bengoetxea,
‘we prefer spending money in ways that enable jobs to be maintained before spending
on compensation as a result of closure.’ These operations had the backing of 90% of the
workers at the Lyon plant, as manifested in a ballot, as well as the support of most of
the French trade unions and full support from the Italian ones at the Italian plant.
5.3 A new future for Fagor-Brandt
In April 2014, after the bankruptcy of Fagor, the French home appliance man-
ufacturer Fagor-Brandt resumed operations following its acquisition by Cevital for
€25 million. The Commercial Court in Nanterre approved the proposed takeover of
Fagor-Brandt submitted by the Algerian conglomerate Cevital. It retained most of Fagor-
Brandt’s plants, thereby saving 1,225 out of 1,800 jobs. In all, Cevital, the banks and
the state invested €200 million to facilitate the restart of the group, renamed ‘Brandt
France’ with the former Fagor general manager J. Treviño appointed as the new CEO.
Besides, SITL company of Lyon, which went bankrupt in 2013, was bought by Centro
Motor Corporation in June 2014; an American multinational manufacturer of electric
commercial and passengers vehicles. The Centro Motor factory in Lyon (ex-SITL), with
390 workers, declared bankruptcy in May 2015.
6 The Polish Fagor-Mastercook subsidiary
6.1 From communism to globalised capitalism
The Polish company Fagor-Mastercook, better known as Wrozamet, had its origins
in a German firm founded by Albert Knauth in Breslau at the beginning of the twentieth
century and in operation until the Soviet occupation during the Second World War. At
the end of the war, Breslau became part of communist Poland under the name Wroclaw.
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The metal and steel casting at the old Knauth plant was re-established under the
new name Wrocławskie Zakłady Metalurgiczne, which came to be known as Wrozamet.
The company manufactured enamel saucepans, cookers and washing machines and
was considered a reference point for Polish communist economic development (Fagor-
Mastercook 2012). It was also a major player in the changes that shook Poland in the
1980s. The trade union Solidarność boasted a large number of members at Wrozamet
who took part in the industrial actions and strikes that led to the fall of the communist
regime in Poland and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
In late 1997, Fagor began to transfer technology to Wrozamet in order to manu-
facture a new model of cooker. Finally, in 1999, Fagor took over the company Wrozamet
S.A. in an auction that took place as part of the privatisation process of hitherto state-
owned companies. Fagor and the Mondragon Corporation acquired 76% of the company
via a joint investment totalling 31.25 million Euros, subsequently acquiring almost the
entire company (Ugarte 2006, Errasti and Mendizabal 2007). After the takeover, the
company became known as Fagor-Mastercook and substantial investments were made
(140 million Euros during the period 1999–2010) in order to set new production lines.
However, the R&D and product engineering capacity of the plant is minimal.
6.2 Rade union participation and disputes at Fagor-Mastercook
Despite not offering the highest tender, the bid submitted by Fagor was the
one preferred by the unions represented at Wrozamet and, ultimately, by the Polish
Government. One of the reasons was the social package offered by the cooperative,
which, apart from maintaining the highest number of jobs, included social improve-
ments for the workers and worker representation on the company’s Board of Directors
(Ugarte 2006, Errasti and Mendizabal 2007). When Fagor took over the company, it had
1,700 employees, but it had become obsolete and highly-integrated vertically, so that
Fagor considered it necessary to carry out major restructuring, implemented by expa-
triate cooperative managers. In just a few years, the workforce first fell to 900 workers,
and then gradually rose to 1,750 employees by 2008.
According to the human resources manager at Fagor and representative on the
Board of Directors of Fagor-Mastercook, Xabier Bengoetxea, ‘the presence of trade union
representatives on the Board of Directors facilitates relations with the workers, even in
the most difficult of times.’ For instance, when the company was bought and had to be
restructured, resulting in the loss of nearly one thousand jobs, the process was carried
out by consensus, with management pledging to reinstate as many of the workers who
had been laid off as possible (Amado-Borthayre 2010). The trade union representative on
the Board, Lech Back, stated ‘that their [the unions’] participation reflects another way
of running the company. We have more information and a greater voice than workers at
the competitor Whirlpool subsidiary just round the corner.’ In 2009 Fagor-Mastercook
received the exemplary employer award from the President of the Polish Republic, Lech
Kaczynski, at the request of the National Committee of the trade union, Solidarność.
Conversely, an industrial dispute between the management of Fagor-Mastercook
and the trade union, Sierpen 80, illustrates a less harmonious relationship. In June 2008,
in view of the crisis being faced by Fagor, the management considered an adjustment
plan that included a reduction in wages and a decrease in the workforce. Employment
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fell by 200 as a result of retirement and non-renewal of temporary contracts. Sierpen
80, despite being a minority trade union within the company, announced a call to strike
against the ‘super-exploitation’ measures being taken. According to Boguslaw Zietek,
the national leader of Sierpen 80, ‘this call was heavily repressed: one union leader
was arrested and two others were dismissed. Solidarność behaved like a company union
bought by management’. The trade union engaged in a censure campaign in the media
in the Basque Country (Berria 2008, Gara 2008), and activists mounted an international
campaign in the social media on behalf of the dismissed workers. In the words of human
resources manager at Fagor-Mastercook, Ana Pitulec, the dismissals were justified be-
cause ‘the workers had abandoned their workplace in order to call the strike. Moreover,
the judge in the case ruled in favour of the company.’ The Chairman of Fagor claimed
that ‘this was a minority trade union that sought notoriety.’ Solidarność categorises
Sierpen 80 as being a ‘radical trade union on the extreme left.’
6.3 The future of Fagor Mastercook
In April 2015, the German household appliance production group BSH (Bosch und
Siemens Hausgeräte) acquired Fagor Mastercook. The offer of the Chinese Haier had
not been taken into consideration. The deal was valued at €21.44 million. BSH vowed to
invest €28.6 million to resume production of cookers and ovens in 2016 and expects to
create 500 jobs by the end of 2019. Except for some members of the human resource and
maintenance department, the 800 employees at Fagor Mastercook were made redundant
at the moment of signing the deal with BSH.
7 Findings and discussion. Fagor: a different kind of multinational?
7.1 Business failure: international plant management within a context of recession
The globalised approach to international multi-location production involves closely
managed coordination (Yip and Bink 2007). Top management at the Fagor Group, who
were all members of the cooperative, and appointed by the worker-members’ representa-
tives on the Governing Council, designed strategic planning in terms of plants, products,
R&D, investment, alliances, etc. for all multinational activity. The strategic plan had to
be approved by the general assembly of worker-members of Fagor; the 2013–2016 plan
was approved in December 2012 with 63.5% in favour and a significant 37.5% against
(Fagor 2012b). The plan was then implemented in the parent company and in the foreign
subsidiaries. There was no doubt that the personnel appointed to top management of
the subsidiaries – whether expatriates or locals – were loyal to the parent company and
the global strategy. In the case of Fagor-Mastercook, expatriates from Mondragon took
control of the company in the immediate wake of the takeover and the first years of
the restructuring process, but since 2009, the company had been monitored from Mon-
dragon with almost no expatriates at all. The functional managers of the subsidiaries
were under the supervision of the managers of the parent company.
For Fagor, as for many multinationals (Dicken 2011), one of the most important
issues in strategic planning was the distribution of products and activity between plants,
which in the last period took place in the context of a recession. With its plants in the
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Basque Country, France and Italy, Fagor became the European manufacturer with the
largest number of workers in a high cost country. As the general manager Fabian Bilbao
underlined, ‘earlier, the strategy was to concentrate top-of-the-range production at some
plants in Mondragon and France, whereas the production of bottom of the range products
with less value added had been transferred to Poland. Now, it is not enough’. In fact, the
cost per hour calculated by Fagor was 21 Euros in the Mondragon or Lyon plants but
5 Euros per hour in Wroclaw.
During the last declining years, the adjustment of production affected both the
Fagor plants in the Basque Country and those of Fagor-Brandt in France and Italy.
Mondragon lost activity in favour of Fagor-Mastercook, although it had gained some
activity from Fagor-Brandt, which enabled it to improve its dwindling profitability.
Job losses primarily affected the Mondragon cooperative plants, although no plant had
closed down in the period up to 2013. Nonetheless, the 2013–2016 strategic plan foresaw
a reduction in production in the Basque Country and France to the benefit of Poland, the
closure of a furniture manufacturing plant in the Basque Country and the sale of some
of Fagor’s warehouses and cooperatives plants like Geyser Gastech and Edesa, which
produced water heaters and storage tanks. Worker-members at the Basque Country
plants, slated for sale, would remain cooperative members on leave of absence for seven
years, and then become salaried workers of the companies taking them over (Fagor
2012b). In the words of the Chairman of Fagor, Jabier Retegi: ‘Production is not moved,
but rather it moves itself – it’s as simple as that. We sell or close down plants when there
is no other alternative, trying to do the least damage possible.’ Meanwhile, the 2013–
2016 strategic plan envisaged improving the profitability of trademarks, technology and
production capacity through alliances with manufacturers from emerging economies
like Russia, Mexico and China.
7.2 Extension and survival of the cooperative model
Not only was the survival of the cooperative model in jeopardy, but so was that of
the company itself. Moreover, the cooperative nature of the parent company constrained
Fagor’s ability to merge strategically with competitors, as such mergers would likely
lead to Fagor losing its cooperative character. Fagor’s commitment to the cooperative
movement was evident, and the parent company tried to continue to be a cooperative.
However, the extension of the cooperative model to European subsidiaries, let alone to
subsidiaries in Africa and Asia, appeared unlikely. Even if the European Union were to
allow the creation of a European cooperative society (European Council 2003), neither
Fagor members nor workers nor trade unionists at Fagor-Brandt and Fagor-Mastercook
seemed all that keen to become a European cooperative. Company trade unions in Poland
and France did not consider this option realistic and nobody was seriously proposing
it. Meanwhile – and this was a determining factor – the top management and worker-
members in the Basque Country did not want to lose control of the company or of
its subsidiaries. As a Fagor member pointed out, ‘workers at Fagor-Brandt and Fagor
Mastercook might form a majority and, for instance, decide to close down the Mondragon
plants.’
An example of the disunity and lack of mutual understanding among workers-
members and workers at different Fagor plants was that there existed no European
Works Council (EWC). Through their EWCs, workers across the European Union have
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a right to information and consultation on company decisions at European level. The
EWC Directives apply to companies with 1,000 or more employees, including at least
150 in two or more Member States (European Union 2009). However, due to cultural
and language barriers, trade union disunity in subsidiaries and, above all, a laissez-faire
attitude on the part of Fagor’s headquarters, no EWC or any other equivalent body had
been established at Fagor. Indeed, surprisingly enough, no body of this type exists in
any Mondragon multinational.
Overall, we were surprised at how little the workers of Fagor subsidiaries knew
about the other plants or even about the parent company. Union workers at subsidiaries
also commonly contended that the Fagor Social Council ‘represents more the interests of
bazkideak as owners and managers than the interests of bazkideak as workers’. A Fagor
human resource manager, in turn, argued ‘that Spanish labour legislation doesn’t oblige
the company to establish any EWC, which for the moment we do not view as feasible
because of trade union disunity’.
According to Fagor top management, the Fagor and Mondragon social strategy
in subsidiaries was based on the corporate management model (CMM) and on the sub-
sidiary participation model, put forward by the Mondragon Group in 2010 as a series
of indicators and minimums that the corporation advises cooperatives about in matters
related to workers’ management in subsidiaries (Mondragon 2010). This model, which
represented an attempt by Mondragon to give some coherence to the management of
subsidiaries, aimed to encourage a management style patterned on the Mondragon
cooperative model, although converting subsidiaries into cooperatives or considering
substantial transformations was clearly not among its objectives. Another pillar of the
social strategy was Fagor’s commitment to defending employment and a more human-
istic management style in terms of subsidiary management.
The Social Council of Fagor wholly supported the view of the Board of Directors and
the management regarding the social policies implemented in international expansion.
They considered Fagor to be taking the right steps and that that moment, ‘when many
members’ jobs are at stake, is not the best moment for changes. The priority of the
bazkideak now is to save our jobs’, as Mikel Mateos, the vice president of Fagor’s Central
Social Council argued. Within the Fagor plants in Mondragon the only critical voices
came from the members of the small quasi-union AK (Ahots Kooperatibista), which
argued that ‘proclamations made by Mondragon to transfer the cooperative spirit to
subsidiaries are not credible, because the purpose of these is to serve the cooperatives’
(Domenech et al. 2006). Likewise, AK emphasises that ‘when internationalising Fagor,
no distinction is made between it and other multinationals in hardly anything’ (Olabe
et al. 2007). AK condemned the destruction of jobs in the Basque and French plants
as well as the confrontations the management had had with French trade unions. AK
members also deplored the labour disputes that had occurred at the Polish plant, and
had demonstrated solidarity with dismissed workers. They did, however, consider the
measures taken at the Lyon and Verolanuova plants with labour support to have been
the right ones.
The experiences at the Fagor-Brandt plant in Lyon – first following its takeover
by Fagor in 2005 and then in the wake of its subsequent transfer to another company
group in 2012 – form an interesting case that can shed light on the differences between
management by Fagor and management by previous and subsequent owners. In the
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opinion of practically everyone, including workers, management and trade union rep-
resentatives, and even members of Fagor itself, there were no noteworthy differences.
The human resource director at Mondragon drew attention to ‘perhaps a closer, more
egalitarian style of relations, more similar to what we are accustomed to in the coop-
erative. We appoint managers who can reflect and expand on our management style.’
However, the French CGT trade union representative, Paul Briglia, stated that follow-
ing the takeover by Fagor ‘nothing changed, we didn’t have any cooperative training and
nobody talked to us about the Mondragon model, they just talked about productivity im-
provements’, while since the exit of FagorBrandt ‘the only differences, mostly negative,
stem from being a small, isolated company, rather than part of a large group’.
In any event, it is not easy to export the cooperative spirit ‘à la distance’ or via
nothing more than a small number of expatriates. Moreover, interesting paradoxes also
emerge regarding the integration-responsiveness dilemma: the more expatriates sent by
a cooperative to the subsidiary, the more possibilities for expanding the cooperative cul-
ture – yet at the same time the subsidiary becomes less autonomous and more dependent
on the parent company, and vice-versa. In addition, the onus is on the parent company
and the cooperative expatriate to adapt to the institutional context of the subsidiary,
which further limits cultural or ideological transfer from the parent company to the
subsidiary. As a former cooperative expatriate in Fagor-Mastercook pointed out ‘a lot of
time is needed to get accustomed to the way of working in the new country: languages
and industrial culture are great barriers. Our mission was to restructure the subsidiary
and improve its productivity and quality. And just when you have become accustomed
to the country, the factory and the people, it is time to come back home.’
In short, we found that the international plant management and the extension
of the cooperative model were closely connected in Fagor. Economic, legal, cultural
and investment barriers underlined in other cooperativization attempts (Flecha and
Ngai 2014) hampered the implementation of cooperative models in Fagor’s subsidiaries.
However, probably the most difficult barrier to overcome was the resulting loss of control
over the subsidiaries that could threaten the jobs of cooperative members at the parent
company.
8 Concluding remarks
Despite some of Fagor’s activity and jobs being rescued by capitalist firms, a
remarkable cooperative firm has ceased to exist, along with many jobs, savings, in-
vestments and business and cooperation know-how. Fagor’s failure may be seen as the
result of a mixed cluster of causes, including business cycles, poor conditions in the
overall economy and in the specific market in which Fagor operated, excessive produc-
tive and commercial dependence on the Spanish market, under-utilization of production
facilities, competitive pressure from larger and technologically more advanced firms
on the one hand and the firms from emerging economies on the other, and excessive
debt due to a risky international growth strategy. In particular, the real estate boom
in Spain from 1996–2007, when a disproportionate amount of new construction for a
single country within the EU, led Fagor to having unrealistic expectations for continued
home appliance sales. Eventually, the bursting of the bubble, which was harsher than
expected, dealt the fatal blow to Fagor.
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Before its closure, the aim of the international multi-location production strategy
at Fagor was to produce a homogeneous entity rather than a loosely connected organi-
sation. This objective may have been fulfilled for production, where the Fagor European
production plants with similar assembly lines and work organisation experienced the
pull to achieve internal consistency. This prompted them to adopt practices from Fagor
headquarters, such as the conventional participatory innovation Total Quality Manage-
ment. At the same time, however, every plant had its own distinctive features with a
strong isomorphic pull from the firm’s institutional environment, as the institutional
economic theory suggests (Blumentritt and Night 2002, Hedlund 1993).
This practice was particularly visible in the field of labour relations. The three
companies that have been analysed in this article represented three different mod-
els of labour relations. One was the French model, represented by the Fagor-Brandt
subsidiary, which featured well-developed labour legislation and a major trade union
presence, and where workers enjoyed significant bargaining power and had been able
to exert pressure over public opinion, the company and government, both in the pe-
riod prior to the takeover by Fagor and subsequently. Another was the case of the
Fagor-Mastercook plant in Poland, which represented a transition from a communist
to a capitalist model in which trade unionists played a major role but that gave rise
to very flexible labour legislation and some highly institutionalised trade unions. In
this context, Fagor-Mastercook managed to develop a labour relations model with a fair
amount of consensus and the participation of trade unions on the Board of Directors,
albeit not without labour disputes. At none of the subsidiaries was there workers’ par-
ticipation either in terms of profits or ownership. The third was the alternative labour
relations model at the parent cooperative company Fagor, which was worker-owned and
employee-managed, albeit also not free from paradoxes and disputes, as the well-known
1974 Fagor internal strike, discussed by Whyte and Whyte (1991), Greenwood et al.
(1991), Kasmir (1996), Cheney (1999), demonstrates.
With regard to the integration-responsiveness dilemma in the multi-location pro-
duction of Fagor, the results of the research presented here reflect the fact that there was
no doubt as to who governed the multinational Fagor. The Fagor international organisa-
tion was based on a clear hierarchy in which the cooperative headquarters, elected and
controlled by the worker-members, decided the overall strategies regarding production,
R&D, investments, strategic alliances, etc. Foreign subsidiaries retained some bargain-
ing power, but chiefly by means of trade union action rather than through the structures
of the organisation itself. The various foreign subsidiaries were socially isolated from one
another, as the lack of a European Working Council or any other workers’ global repre-
sentation body demonstrates. The divisions among the foreign subsidiaries and the lack
of communication both among them and between them and the bazkideak facilitated
the wielding of company power by top management within the Fagor multinational. The
parent company Fagor – top management as well as worker-members – did not seem
interested in developing a federative nature for the group or in relinquishing power
to foreign subsidiaries, although they did occasionally give more voice to trade unions
than a traditional multinational might do (as, for example, in the case of the Polish
plant discussed here). In this sense, Fagor and Mondragon multinationals will feder-
alise only to the extent that doing so does not detract from the ability of the cooperative
headquarters and the members to retain control over the multinational group and the
subsidiaries. That reality, more than economic, legal, cultural and investment-related
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barriers mentioned by Flecha and Ngai (2014), would be the principal obstacle to any
effort to transform Mondragon’s foreign subsidiaries into cooperatives.
The case of employment preservation presented similar ambiguities. Despite the
dominant nature of the Fagor multinational, it had displayed substantial sensitivity
to job preservation. Fagor endeavoured to minimise the social cost of its restructuring
measures both at the cooperative plants and at the plants of the European subsidiaries.
As we have noted, there were new features in the social policy being pursued by the
European subsidiaries, such as relocation through the transfer of plants carried out
with worker and trade union consent, as opposed to through plant closure and dismissal
of workers. In the Basque Country, the Mondragon solidarity mechanisms and the
capacity for sacrifice on the part of members shaped the way that Fagor dealt with the
current crisis and with job losses; both of these make cooperatives extremely resilient
companies, but not invulnerable. Most of Mondragon cooperatives have so far coped
with the crisis without company closures or the dismissal of worker-owner-members,
something accomplished by putting Mondragon solidarity mechanisms into practice.
In the case of Fagor, nonetheless, the cooperative nature of the parent company,
and its emphasis on defending members’ jobs at all costs, may had have a negative effect
on the subsidiary plants and on the future of the company as whole. An international
division of labour existed within the company, not only because of the division into a
cooperative nucleus and a capitalist periphery made up of multiple subsidiaries, but also
stemming from the prioritising of the Mondragon plants over other subsidiaries in terms
of jobs, the manufacture of products with higher value added and core functions such as
R&D capacity, as Hymer has suggested (1979). This division was even more marked if
one includes the subsidiaries located in the developing countries, such as those in China
and Morocco (Errasti 2015), in the analysis.
In summary, while the point of reference of most multinationals is the rate of
profit that is earned elsewhere (Burawoy 1985), the primary point of reference in Fagor
was maintaining locals jobs and local control. This is consistent with research recently
conducted by Heras (2014), which concludes that job security is the strongest tie binding
members to the cooperatives. The objective of preservation of local cooperative employ-
ment instead of profit maximization, derived from Fagor´s worker-owners democratic
approach to decision-making, conditioned its strategy, and was not helpful in trying
to keep the cooperative competitive in a global industry. However, in our opinion, the
badly timed expansion and the intensity and the duration of the European – and mainly
Spanish – economic recession, which also brought down many conventional businesses,
was far more significant in determining the failure of the Basque cooperative.
Global capitalism and the transformation of some Mondragon cooperatives into
multinationals have accentuated the tensions, predicted by the Webb´s, between co-
operative principles and success in a capitalist environment. As we have seen, Fagor
maintained its cooperative principles in the companies in the Basque Country, as much
as democratic governance and participatory systems can be developed in large market
driven cooperatives (Cheney 1999, Heras 2014). Nevertheless, Fagor failed in its aim to
develop another model of cooperative-multinational more in tune with participation and
cooperation principles. Studies that have examined specific regeneration schemes at dif-
ferent Mondragon multinationals (Errasti 2003, Luzarraga et al. 2007, Luzarraga and
Irizar 2012, Bakaikoa et al. 2013, Flecha and Ngai 2014, Storey et al. 2014), show that
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regeneration schemes have been relatively rare and unsatisfactory. These initiatives
have not significantly managed to encourage workers to participate in the management,
ownership and profits of subsidiaries, in a way that would clearly distinguish them from
conventional multinationals subsidiaries. Indeed, one of the main challenges for cooper-
atives today is to develop processes of internationalisation that are consistent with their
democratic nature through the integration and replication of cooperative structures into
international expansion (Radrigán and Barrı́a 2007, Flecha and Ngai 2014).
In the present environment, merely surviving in the global capitalist market econ-
omy is a challenge for many cooperatives. Applying cooperative principles presents
special challenges in the multinational company setting, giving rise to a plethora of
dilemmas, paradoxes and contradictions. Nevertheless, the Mondragon cooperative-
multinationals offer a unique opportunity to explore new channels towards expanding
economic participation in international business activities. We expect that the anal-
ysis conducted here, together with future research in the fields of cooperativism and
multinationalisation, will help the over one hundred cooperatives of Mondragon, espe-
cially the multinationalised cooperatives, and other cooperatives of the world, to develop
governance and managerial models that contradict the Webbs assessment.
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